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The shift toward adoption of electronic health records 
(EHRs) and various computer systems in healthcare has 
been motivated in part by the need to provide consumers 
and clinicians with timely access to protected health 
information (PHI) and decision support systems (Ballmann, 
2015; Kokkonen et al., 2013; Kowitlawakul, Chan, Pulcini, & 
Wang, 2015; Rindfleisch, 1997). These technologies store 
and transmit large amounts of electronic protected health 
information (ePHI), necessitating vigilance in implementing 
protocols to optimize the privacy and security (P&S) of 
users’ data. Such action is especially important for blocking 
attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities of these systems and 
preventing unauthorized access to ePHI (Adhikari, Richards, 
& Scott, 2014; Gunter & Terry, 2005; O'Brien & Yasnoff, 
1999). 
Growing concerns over the P&S of healthcare 
information have brought about expansion of healthcare 
regulations such as HIPAA and HITECH to safeguard 
patient data/information. These concerns have also resulted 
in the overhaul of the P&S requirements necessary to 
achieve compliance, as well as tremendous increases in 
fines for noncompliance (Kwon & Johnson, 2013). 
Noncompliance with HIPAA can lead to severe 
consequences for covered entities (CEs). The most severe 
consequence is a fine of up to $250,000 and up to 10 years 
of imprisonment if the intent is to sell, transfer, or use 
individually identifiable health information for commercial 
advantage, personal gain, or malicious purposes (Annas, 
2003; Choi, Capitan, Krause, & Streeper, 2006). This 
maximum fine has been increased to $1.5 million with the 
HITECH rule. Internal audit checklists can help to mitigate 
the security vulnerabilities of healthcare applications and 
technologies. By serving as the blueprint for broader and 
more detailed P&S policies, these checklists can be 
implemented in existing systems. Likewise, they can be 
incorporated into the development life cycle of new self-
service systems and technologies, particularly those 
situated in the community outside of institutional systems.  
SELF-SERVICE TECHNOLOGIES 
Self-service enables consumers to perform activities 
related to the provision of a particular service without the 
intervention of a service provider (Ding, Verma, & Iqbal, 
2007; Yang, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2014). Self-service 
technologies (SSTs) contribute an estimated $130 billion to 
the U.S. economy and have been used successfully for 
years. This huge fiscal impact, coupled with advances in 
computer hardware, software, and Internet technology, 
means that SSTs are being deployed in more and more 
sectors of the service delivery system (Castro et al., 2010). 
Examples include automated teller machines (ATMs), flight 
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check-in kiosks, pay-at-the-pump gas stations, self-pay 
parking meters and pay stations, CD rental kiosks, self-
checkout kiosks at supermarkets, Internet and cell phone 
apps, and online classes or e-learning.  
Many people use SSTs without even knowing it, as 
when they pay bills online or fill their gas tanks. The main 
factors driving adoption of SSTs across all major industries 
are efficiency and cost savings. While providing 
organizations with a competitive advantage (Hsieh, 2015) 
and enabling employees to perform other functions 
(Burkhart, 2012; Castro, Atkinson, & Ezell, 2010), SSTs 
allow consumers to participate in service delivery and enjoy 
convenience and control.  
MULTI-USER HEALTH KIOSKS 
AND POTENTIAL THREATS 
Self-service technologies deployed in the health sector 
include multi-user health kiosks such as those for self-
monitoring of blood pressure that are frequently located in 
pharmacies and grocery stores (Curran & Meuter, 2005; 
Meuter, Ostrom, Roundtree, & Bitner, 2000). Hospitals often 
deploy multi-user health kiosks to automate patient 
management services for admission, discharge, 
appointment scheduling, and patient check-in. They also 
leverage these technologies for the processing of co-
payments, patient consent forms, and prescription refill 
requests, and for verification of insurance eligibility, often in 
different languages (Meuter, Ostrom, Roundtree, & Bitner, 
2000; Soares et al., 2016).  
Multi-user health kiosks present several P&S issues 
that need to be addressed  The same characteristics that 
make these devices attractive for use in the self-service 
environment also render them vulnerable to P&S breaches 
(Günay, Erbuğ, Hekkert, & Herrera, 2014; Smith, 2008; 
Uhley, 2006). Owing to their quasi-portable and unattended 
nature, multi-user health kiosks are typically deployed in 
public places. This makes them susceptible to invasion of 
privacy by bystanders as well as intrusion attacks by 
malicious individuals for whom unsupervised access 
provides cover for launching repeated attempts to breach 
kiosk systems. 
Most kiosk patrons do not need explicit IT or network 
privileges such as user names and passwords to initiate 
interaction with the kiosk. They instead use some form of 
generic log-on information, which makes it challenging for 
system administrators to manage or track user activities and 
protect against security threats. Kiosk users can also 
become victims of identity theft and fraud if they are 
oblivious to “shoulder surfing” by others while logging in or 
entering information (Ciampa, 2008; Craig, 2008; Kizza, 
2013b; Smith, 2008; Uhley, 2006).  
 
Vandals can intentionally damage or compromise kiosk 
hardware by attaching their own devices to the network via 
accessible CD-ROM drives and USB ports, thereby 
instigating a man-in-the-middle attack. Because multi-user 
health kiosks are usually connected to larger, shared 
organizational networks (i.e., the same networks used for 
other information technology services), attackers can wreak 
considerable havoc on an organization’s network by 
compromising kiosks on that network. Attackers bent on 
bypassing kiosk operating system access controls can then 
access the underlying operating system and file system 
(Ciampa, 2008; Craig, 2008; Kizza, 2013b; Smith, 2008; 
Uhley, 2006). 
Because multi-user health kiosks are used with little or 
no supervision, it is essential for them to be configured to 
prevent users from viewing others’ data, installing malicious 
programs, tampering with the kiosk software, or gaining 
access to the operating system and the file system. It is, 
however, very difficult to tie down systems without losing 
some of functionality. A balanced approach to mitigating 
P&S risks is the best way to go, and it should include these 
steps: 
1. Deploy multi-user health kiosks in well-lit areas, to 
protect both the user and the equipment from 
violent or malicious people. 
2. Install privacy screens on kiosks, to make it difficult 
for anyone else to see what appears on the screen 
when someone is logged on. 
3. Prevent unrestricted access to the underlying kiosk 
hardware by eliminating external access to cabling 
or internal components such as hard drives and 
USB and serial ports that would allow installation of 
malicious software or devices. 
4. Enclose internal components including hard drives 
in secure housings to prevent theft of hardware.  
5. Avoid peripheral devices such as keyboards that 
could enable hackers to install devices like 
keyboard recorders to capture users’ keystrokes 
and thus gain access to personal and confidential 
information.  
6. Equip each kiosk with a touch screen instead of a 
regular keyboard and mouse (if possible). If a 
physical keyboard is unavoidable, opt for a special 
keyboard without function keys. 
7. Deploy kiosks on their own dedicated networks, 
and utilize sub-netting, firewalls, and other intrusion 
prevention systems in order to segment the kiosk 
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8. Use special-purpose operating systems specifically 
designed for kiosks to prevent users from 
performing unauthorized functions.  
9. Configure the operating system access control 
mechanism to make it difficult to bypass, by using 
“reference monitoring,” or a set of well-defined 
design requirements, to enforce the access control 
mechanism (Craig, 2008; Jaege, 2013). 
TRICKS BY ATTACKERS 
 
Kiosks in general may be exposed to a host of network 
attacks. The following are tricks that attackers may employ 
to get around kiosks’ access control mechanisms: 
 Most health kiosks use Microsoft applications that have 
built-in Visual Basic (VB) editors. Attackers can activate 
and use these editors to write small scripts to open 
loopholes by which to gain unlimited access to the 
system. For example, an attacker can use the ALT+F1 
key combination in a blank Word document to open up 
the VB editor. Similar tricks can be employed in the VI 
text editor in Linux (Ballmann, 2015; Craig, 2008).  
 Browsers offer another way an attacker can gain 
access to the file system. Most kiosks have various 
functionalities of browsers disabled. Typically, the 
address bar is disabled. However, holding down the 
shift key and clicking on a hyperlink will open up the link 
in a new browser window, usually with the address bar 
enabled (Craig, 2008).  
 The calculator provides access to another method an 
attacker can use to infiltrate a kiosk system. Most health 
kiosks use Microsoft Windows operating systems that 
contain calculators. Clicking F1 while the calculator 
application is open will usually activate the Help 
function. There is a tap in the Help function labeled 
‘Jump URL.” Clicking on this will open the web browser 
and provide access to other areas of the file system 
(Craig, 2008). 
Additional security concerns pertain to kiosks designed 
and deployed in the context of healthcare. Examples 
include:  
 Masquerading/unauthorized access: By gaining 
unlawful access to another user’s credentials through 
illegal means such as hacking or shoulder surfing, 
imposters can gain access to that user’s health data or 
escalate their privileges on a network (Ballmann, 2015; 
Craig, 2008).  
 Unauthorized use of resources: Unscrupulous users 
can utilize various illegal means including privilege 
escalation, backdoors, rootkit, default accounts, and 
unprotected access points to gain access to resources 
on a network or network computers, allowing them 
access to another user’s PHI (Ballmann, 2015; Craig, 
2008).  
 Unauthorized disclosure and flow of information: Once 
an attacker has access to the kiosk system, he or she 
can install network taps or malicious code/applications 
to gain access to a host of personal information, 
including information retained on kiosks or saved on 
servers and other network devices. After obtaining this 
initial information, the attacker can engage in further 
clandestine activities such as man-in-the-middle attacks 
and denial-of-service attacks (Ballmann, 2015; Smith, 
2008; Smith, 2012; Uhley, 2006).   
 User errors/forgetfulness: The least talked-about P&S 
vulnerability of healthcare kiosks is failure by a user to 
log out completely or to exit the system after using it. 
This is an easy setup for another person to latch onto 
the non-terminated session to gain access to the user’s 
information or even compromise the entire system (Fei 
Yu, 2011; Kizza, 2013a).  
For multi-user health kiosks to be HIPAA/HITECH-
compliant and meet the requirements of other state and 
federal regulations, procedures must be in place to minimize 
P&S threats. In the absence of clear-cut compliance 
measures, kiosk architecture should be designed from the 
bottom up with HIPAA/HITECH and other regulations in 
mind. That means that the system should be able to protect 
or ensure security, privacy, confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and non-repudiation of information. Careful 
attention must also be paid to aspects of HIPAA/HITECH 
that deal with CEs and business associates (BAs). Audit 
checklists based on the OCR audit protocol should be 
incorporated into the development and deployment process 
of health kiosks.  
DEVELOPING A PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY CHECKLIST FOR A 
MULTI-USER HEALTH KIOSK 
The Health Kiosk Project at the University of Pittsburgh 
provides an example of how such an audit checklist has 
been developed. Funded by the Agency for Health Care 
Research and Quality (5R01HS022889 PI: Matthews), the 
project involves several health kiosks that have been 
designed for use by older adults in community-based 
congregate settings. The settings include senior centers, 
subsidized senior housing, and continuing care retirement 
communities.  
Each kiosk consists of a wheeled desk and desk chair, 
touch screen monitor, RFID reader, printer, and selected 
medical devices that either require manual entry of  
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measurements (blood pressure monitoring device) or are 
integrated (hand dynamometer and seated scale) with the 
on-board computer. The hard drive is encrypted, as are data 
transferred from the kiosk via MiFi hotspot to secure 
university servers. A cell phone in the kiosk drawer 
facilitates users’ requests for assistance, and a messaging 
feature on the touch screen enables textual communication 
with the project team.  
At the kiosk, users self-administer health-related 
surveys, learn behavioral strategies for improving aspects of 
their health, and receive graphical feedback depicting their 
progress toward personal goals related to sleep, bladder 
control, mobility, and mood, among other topics. Wireless 
headphones convey voiceover for all content displayed on 
the touch screen. Relevant educational materials may be 
printed to take home. 
The following steps were implemented to develop an 
audit checklist for addressing potential P&S vulnerabilities of 
the kiosks in the Health Kiosk Project:  
1. Investigate and Research Possible Security 
Vulnerabilities: This step entailed garnering expert 
opinions from published work, textbooks, and interviews 
with people involved in the design and development of 
the system, and from “walking through the systems” 
(Bishop, 2003; Craig, 2008; Garg & Camp, 2015). 
Specifically, we drew from the literature, interviews with 
the project team, and direct interaction with the kiosk. 
We also used the penetration testing techniques 
(PENTESTING) specified by Craig (2008) to aid in 
identifying possible vulnerabilities of our multi-user 
health kiosk design.  
2. Perform a Risk Assessment: Eight steps were involved 
in assessing the extent to which P&S could be 
breached (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Oyelami & Ithnin, 
2015; Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002): 
A. Characterize the system: This step helped to define 
the scope of the risk assessment by identifying 
items that needed to be protected. We recognized 
that a solid understanding of the system’s 
architecture as a whole was needed to successfully 
complete this step (Garg & Camp, 2015; Oyelami & 
Ithnin, 2015). Hence, system information was 
collected and classified as: hardware, software, 
system interfaces (external and internal 
connectivity), data and information, individuals who 
support as well as use the system, main functions 
of the system (functions performed by the system), 
criticality of the various components of the system 
to the organization (e.g., how critical the particular 
component is to system functionality), and 
sensitivity of system components. After carefully 
looking through and analyzing various aspects of 
the health kiosk system, working with the project 
team, and using information about P&S for multi-
user health kiosks discussed earlier in this paper,  
 
we identified areas of the system that needed to be 
protected. These areas formed the core part of the 
header for the major sections of our audit checklist.  
B. Identify threats: Possible threats to the system that 
could lead to vulnerabilities were characterized as 
high, medium, or low. Informed by expert opinion, 
the developer’s past experience, and industry 
trends and standards, we focused on identifying 
anticipated threats rather than every possible 
threat, as the latter could have been overwhelming 
and unrealistic to accomplish (Gribaudo, Iacono, & 
Marrone, 2015; Oyelami & Ithnin, 2015). We used 
this process to decide which aspects of P&S were 
worth protecting. Again, information pertaining to 
possible threats to kiosks in general, physical 
interaction with the kiosk during development, and 
discussions with the project team were 
instrumental in identifying the sources of threat to 
our multi-user health kiosk.   
C. Identify vulnerabilities: Action must be taken to 
identify the vulnerabilities that can result from 
threats because vulnerabilities suggest possible 
weaknesses in the system that can be exploited by 
adversaries bent on breaching the system. Some 
of the ways to identify vulnerabilities are system 
security testing and evaluation, penetration testing, 
and vulnerability scanning using any type of 
automated vulnerability testing tool (Rebollo, 
Mellado, Fernández-Medina, & Mouratidis, 2015; 
Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). We undertook this step 
in discussion with the main developer of the kiosk 
to identify whether vulnerabilities existed pertaining 
to password protection, privilege escalation, 
applications and user authentication, and 
encryption, to mention but a few.  
D. Control and analysis: This step entails reviewing 
and analyzing controls that have been 
implemented or are planned to be implemented, to 
reduce the probability of a threat or adversary 
exploiting the system. As part of this step, impact 
analysis should be performed to determine the 
impact (i.e., loss of integrity, loss of availability, and 
loss of confidentiality) to the system in case a 
vulnerability is exploited. The controls can be 
technical or non-technical. An example of a 
technical control would be implementing an 
encryption strategy to protect data. Non-technical 
controls could include personnel training regarding 
proper methods for reducing the probability of a 
vulnerability occurring. Means of control should be 
preventive, deterrent, detective, reactive, and 
capable of recovery (Rebollo et al., 2015; Rinehart-
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The Health Kiosk Project team considered the impact 
that the identified vulnerabilities could have on the 
functionalities of the kiosk. The team then acted to minimize 
or eliminate those vulnerabilities that posed the greatest 
risk.     
E. Determine likelihood of occurrence. This step 
involves estimating the likelihood (high, medium, or 
low) that a particular vulnerability will occur  
(Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). The Health Kiosk 
Project team examined the design and types of 
activities performed on the kiosk to further decide 
which vulnerabilities were more likely to occur. This 
resulted in further streamlining of the kiosk features 
and functionalities that we wanted to protect to 
include in our audit protocol.  
F. Determine risk: Assessing the level of risk to the IT 
system allows for expression of the level of  threat 
and vulnerability for the pairs that have been 
identified, the magnitude of the impact in the event 
that a vulnerability is successfully exploited by a 
given threat, and determination as to whether 
adequate P&S procedures have been put in place 
to reduce the risk (Nazareth & Choi, 2015; 
Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). For the Health Kiosk 
Project, we had a series of meetings to discuss 
how the different vulnerabilities could impact the 
functionality of the kiosk, including what would 
happen if there were no backups and data were 
corrupted or lost in the backend database, or 
whether there was a redundant power supply in 
case of power outages. 
G. Recommend controls:  To reduce or eliminate 
perceived risk, recommendations need to be 
enacted that are appropriate for an organization’s 
operations, requirements, legislated mandates, and 
standards. Factors that should be considered 
during this process include, but are not limited to, 
effectiveness of the recommended options such as 
system compatibility, legislation and regulation, 
organizational policy, operational impact, and 
safety and reliability (Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). 
The Health Kiosk Project team used information 
gathered in the earlier steps as well as 
requirements for HIPAA and HITECH compliance 
to decide the aspects of the OCR audit checklist to 
incorporate into our final audit checklist. 
H. Document the result: Threat sources and potential 
vulnerabilities that are identified should be 
documented in a report or briefing (Rinehart-
Thompson, 2013). For our work, we matched the 
potential vulnerabilities to the OCR Audit protocol. 
We then adopted aspects of the OCR audit 
protocol that match our vulnerabilities to develop 
an audit checklist for the multi-user health kiosk 
(Appendix A) which can be used by any developer, 
researcher, or other user of the health kiosk to 
make sure that the system meets the P&S 
provisions.   
3. Specify the Checklist: The audit checklist was then 
finalized for our kiosk by adapting parts of the OCR 
audit checklist, a checklist developed by Watzlaf et al., 
and a Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information 
Technology Systems that was developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(Christiansen, 2013; Swanson, 2001; Watzlaf, Moeini, & 
Firouzan, 2010; Watzlaf, Moeini, Matusow, & Firouzan, 
2011). 
CONCLUSION 
Recent increases in privacy and security breaches as 
well as increased oversight and fines for HIPAA and 
HITECH violations (Solove, 2013) underscore the need for a 
rigorous approach to ensure that adequate P&S protections 
are in place in self-service technologies that involve 
personal health information. Securing information 
technology systems such as those involved in multi-user 
health kiosks is usually an afterthought in system 
development. The process for checklist development 
discussed in this article can help to make P&S protections 
part of the system development life cycle. The checklist can 
also be used in the development of P&S policies. 
Recognizing that there cannot be HIPAA and HITECH 
compliance without P&S policies (Maji et al., 2008; Peterson 
& Watzlaf, 2015), we endeavor to address that challenge in 
relation to multi-user health kiosks. We maintain that having 
a comprehensive audit checklist for health technologies can 
help with HIPAA and HITECH compliance.  
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APPENDIX A: MULTI-USER HEALTH KIOSK AUDIT CHECKLIST  
The protocol below provides a guideline that can be used to assess whether a multi-user health kiosk is meeting privacy and 
security (P&S) regulations such as HIPAA and HITECH. It has been adapted from the OCR audit protocol and the checklists 
developed by Watzlaf et al. (2010; 2011; 2012), Peterson and Watzlaf (2014), Swanson (2001), and Watzlaf et al. (2010). 
HIPAA/HITECH Compliance Checklist for Multi-User Health Kiosk  
PRIVACY  Yes NO N/A 
1. Personal Information (§164.506, §164.514 (Swanson, 2001; Watzlaf et al., 2010)    
 Is there a privacy policy?    
 Does the kiosk have a privacy screen?    
 Will user information be shared with third-party organizations?    
o If yes, is there a Business Associate agreement (BAA) with this organization?    
2. Retention of Personal Information     
 Is user information and e-PHI stored?    
 Is there a policy outlining the retention period of e-PHI?    
 Can users request copies of their information?    
o If yes, is there a well-defined procedure for requesting copies of PHI and other 
information? 
   
CONFIDENTIALITY  §164.522  (Swanson, 2001)    
3. Request of Information    
 Is there a policy for disclosure of e-PHI or identifiable information?    
SECURITY §164.308 (Swanson, 2001; Watzlaf et al., 2010; Watzlaf et al., 2011)    
4. Security Management Process    
 Is there a well-written procedure or protocol for performing a thorough risk assessment?    
 How many times a year is a risk assessment performed? 
o 0 times per year 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
   
 Is there a formal or informal policy or procedure to review information system activities like 
audit logs, access reports incident tracking etc.? 
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Security (continued) Yes NO N/A 
 Are current security measures sufficient to reduce risk and vulnerabilities to a reasonable 
level? 
   
5. Assigned Security Responsibility    
 Do you have a security officer in charge of developing, implementing, monitoring and 
communicating HIPAA/HITECH security policies and procedures? 
   
6. Workforce Security    
 Do you have documentation for authorization and supervision of all entities working with or 
helping to manage and maintain the kiosk? 
   
 Do you have clear job descriptions for all entities working with the kiosk?     
 Is there documentation listing the level of access to the system, including e-PHI for each 
employee?  
   
 Is there a clear procedure to terminate access to resources once a person is removed from the 
project or terminated? 
   
7. Information Access Management    
 Is there a clear written procedure to grant access to e-PHI?    
 Do policies and standards exist to authorize and document access, review and modify a user’s 
right to computer systems, software, databases and other network resources? 
   
 Are users going to pay to use the kiosk system? 
o If so, will a clearinghouse or third party be used to process payment? 
 If so, are there policies and procedures for access to information, by clearinghouse 
workers, consistent with HIPAA and HITECH security rules? 
   
 Are formal or informal policies and procedures in place for security measures relating to 
access control? 
   
 Is there any HIPAA and HITECH security awareness and training program in place?    
 Are there procedures and measures in place for protection from malicious software and 
exploitation of vulnerabilities? 
   
 Have employees been trained as to the importance of protecting against malicious software 
and how to guard against it? 
   
 Are there policies and procedures for log–on monitoring and password management?    
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Information Access Management (continued) Yes NO N/A 
 How often are security procedures, policies and protocols updated? 
o 0 times per year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
   
 Are there any policies and procedures in place to identify, respond to, report and mitigate 
security incidents? 
   
8. Contingency Plan    
 Is there a contingency plan in place to identify critical applications, data and other operations 
of the kiosk system? 
   
 Is there a disaster recovery and backup plan in place to restore lost data?    
 Is any redundancy built into the kiosk deployment?    
 Is there any well-defined policy for operating in emergency mode that allows continuation of 
critical business processes? 
   
 Are there any policies for testing emergency contingency plans or backup procedures?    
9. Evaluation    
 Are there policies in place for evaluating the security procedures as they apply to 
HIPAA/HITECH security rules? 
   
10.   Business Associate (BA) Contracts    
 Is there a policy for contracts with Business Associates and other third-party vendors?     
11.   Physical Security    
 Are there policies in place to analyze physical security vulnerabilities of the kiosk system?    
 Are there policies in place to guard against physical security vulnerabilities and to protect kiosk 
hardware and components that hold e-PHI? 
   
 Are there procedures and policies in place to control access to kiosk hardware, systems and 
other components by staff, visitors etc. that could compromise the kiosk system as a whole? 
   
 Are there maintenance records for repairs and modification of physical components especially 
relating to security? 
   
12.   Computer Component Use    
 Is there other computer hardware, like workstations and servers that manage the kiosk 
system? 
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Computer Component Use (continued) Yes NO N/A 
o If yes, are there policies and documentation outlining specific workstations and 
servers and their functions and location? 
   
o Is there documentation and procedures to identify specific functions of each 
workstation and server? 
   
13.  Workstation and Server Security     
 Is there any policy or procedure to prevent unauthorized access to an unattended workstation 
or to limit the ability of un-authorized persons to access other users’ information (analyze 
physical surroundings for physical attributes)?  
   
 How are workstations and servers physically restricted to limit or restrict access to only 
authorized people? 
   
14.   Device and Media Controls    
 Is there any policy for monitoring and tracking the location and movement of kiosk hardware 
(especially containing e-PHI)? 
   
15.   Access Control    
 Is there an access control policy?    
 Is there an encryption procedure in place to protect e-PHI?    
o If yes, are there any well documented policies governing and outlining the encryption 
strategy? 
   
 Are there any policies to make sure all users are assigned unique access credentials, like IDs 
and passwords, to log on to the kiosk system? 
   
 Are all users assigned usernames and passwords?    
 Is there documentation of each user’s exact privileges in the kiosk system (useful to prevent 
privilege escalation)? 
   
 Are there clearly defined policies to track changes and modifications made within the kiosk 
system, including which users made the changes? 
   
 Are there any policies in place to make sure user access is reviewed on a periodic basis and 
how often that is done? 
   
 Is the system configured to auto-logoff after a predetermined time?     
o  Is there any documentation and defined policy for this?    
 Are there procedures for terminating access when it is no longer needed?    
16.    Audit Control     
 Has any audit control been implemented?    
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Audit Control (continued) Yes NO N/A 
Are there any audit control policies in place?    
 How often are the audit control tools and mechanisms reviewed to determine if upgrades are 
needed? 
o 0 times per year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
More than three times a year? 
   
  Integrity     
Who has access to information or e-PHI stored in the kiosk systems?    
Is there a well-defined policy or procedure to identify these individuals?    
Person or Entity Authentication    
What kind of authentication procedure or mechanism is in place within the kiosk system?    
Are there any policies to govern this and also evaluate the authentication mechanisms in place to 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the mechanism? 
   
If so does the policy also look at the cost benefit ratio of the various types of authentication 
mechanisms?  
   
Is there a policy to test and upgrade the authentication mechanism tested on a periodic basis?    
Transmission Security    
Is there any formal data transmission policy for the kiosk system?    
Is there any risk assessment policy to determine the security level of the data transmission 
procedure in the kiosk system? 
   
Is there a formal policy for breach notification?    
Is there a template or letter or other defined means of breach notification?    
Does the notification policy include procedure for notification of media outlets?    
Does the policy also spell out notification procedures for Business Associates, if any?    
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